4/3/2026 at 6:17:53 PM
> The attacker used social engineering to induce Drift Security Council multisig signers into pre-signing transactions that appeared routine but carried hidden authorisations.So much for the "Security Council". What an embarrassment to be in a team/org like that and fail your most basic duty which would be "look at what you sign".
by embedding-shape
4/3/2026 at 6:30:56 PM
That was inevitable, and all designs like that will eventually yield the same outcome.The people who should be embarrassed are the ones who thought having a group of humans routinely review (possibly complex) transactions for correctness, with no ability to undo/revert the outcome, was a good idea.
by lokar
4/3/2026 at 6:34:00 PM
Also, how could one reasonably disprove that the signers were not in on the scam?by lokar
4/3/2026 at 6:46:36 PM
That’s the best part, you can’t!by bombcar
4/3/2026 at 7:31:55 PM
This is conveniently suspect, no? “Drift migrated its Security Council on March 27 to a new 2-of-5 threshold with zero timelock. That eliminated the delay that would have allowed detection before admin actions took effect.” This was after the perp started working on the heist earlier in the month.by sebgan
4/3/2026 at 8:32:26 PM
> 2-of-5Just to be sure... They need less than half of the Security Council to approve it?
by gus_massa
4/3/2026 at 9:28:54 PM
If it's a "time-safe" kind of thing, 2-of-5 is common. No one person can open it, but any two can.by bombcar
4/4/2026 at 5:19:17 AM
[dead]by solguarddev
4/3/2026 at 9:35:14 PM
[dead]by solguarddev
4/3/2026 at 10:03:56 PM
This exactly why I hate communism.by bit1993