2/27/2026 at 11:39:47 AM
Will F-droid continue when Google bring in their changes, soon?by scrollop
2/27/2026 at 11:50:25 AM
Even with Google's changes, F-Droid will continue to work with Android phones that do not use Google GMS.If you care about your actually owning your device, install something else than stock OS. I would recommend GrapheneOS, since the security of some/most other alternatives is pretty bad.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 12:53:14 PM
GrapheneOS works only with Pixel devices, which doesn't make it much useful for the vast majority of Android users.by miroljub
2/27/2026 at 1:35:09 PM
Indeed. Sadly the reality is that most other Android devices are simply not secure enough. Many Android phones do not have a separate secure enclave (outside Pixel and IISC Samsung flagship and A5x range), so they are vulnerable to breaking PIN-based unlocking, side channel attacks, etc. Besides that they often only provide old vendor kernel trees, old firmware blobs, etc.So, you have to wonder whether you want such a phone anyway if you care about security and privacy. If you don't care about security anyway, you could as well run /e/OS, etc.
Above-mentioned Samsung phones could perhaps make the cut, but don't support unlocking anymore (and when they still did, would blow a Knox eFuse).
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 2:39:59 PM
Reduced security has always annoyed me a bit as an argument. Sort of in the same way as signal deprecating SMS because it's insecure.I get all or nothing when your threat model is state actors. However, for most people, the benefit is just freedom from corporate agendas.
Not everyone needs kernel hardening, or always E2EE (as with signal). Personally I just like the features it provides (e.g. scoped storage, disabling any app including Google play services, profiles etc etc
Its also an easier sell to people who are apathetic to security when the product is just better and more secure, the same way apple does (for whatever their reasons may be).
All that said, I get they're limited in funds and manpower, plus the things mentioned at the end there, so I can only be so peeved they chose a target and stuck with it. They typically cite security as the reason, not those other ones, however.
by saintfire
2/27/2026 at 3:18:36 PM
Oh man, I am still annoyed about Signal removing SMS support. Had to add another app to my phone and I can now no longer accidentally discover that someone I'm texting has Signal, which happened more than once to me!by Novosell
2/27/2026 at 10:11:39 PM
I only just installed Signal in some abandoned corner of one of my devices to be able to communicate with my 'highschool' classmates (in reality a Dutch Gymnasium so a totally different school system and age group but you get the idea) and had to get the blasted thing working without Google services on a device which for some specific purposes sometimes enables these but mostly has them disabled. As soon as Signal gets a whiff of even a stub of Google services is refuses to work without a fully fledged Google services implementation. To fix this I had to add 'disable Signal' to my 'enable rudimentary Google services' script and to do that I had to find the package name: org.thoughtcrime.securesms
So yes, they're still called 'secure SMS' even though that is no longer part of the deal.I'll only use it for the specified purpose since I far prefer my own XMPP server with OMEMO encryption - which is based on the same 'double ratchet' keying as Signal uses.
by hagbard_c
2/27/2026 at 3:49:20 PM
Reduced security has always annoyed me a bit as an argument.Security is one of one of the main selling points of GrapheneOS, I can fully understand that they don't want to weaken that by supporting fundamentally insecure devices.
I think a nice side-effect is that they only focus on a small number of devices (Pixels) and support those really well. I have followed the /e/OS forums for a while and many devices have constant regressions because it is hard to validate each release on tens of devices.
I get all or nothing when your threat model is state actors.
People do have different thread models, though I think up-to-date software should be the baseline for everyone and where pretty much every phone outside iPhone, Google Pixel, and a subset of Samsung phones fail. Also, I think having a secure enclave should be the baseline, since phones do get stolen.
Its also an easier sell to people who are apathetic to security when the product is just better and more secure, the same way apple does
That's really a weird example though for supporting the argument that GrapheneOS should support more devices. Isn't Pixel + GrapheneOS then pretty much iPhone + iOS? Privacy-respecting, secure, not pushing AI subscriptions all the time (though iOS is getting worse in that respect), offering useful functionality?
At any rate, I understand if you have another phone, you wouldn't buy a Pixel for GrapheneOS, but it does make sense to buy your next phone for running GrapheneOS. Pixel covers a pretty wide price range to, e.g. the Pixel 9a was 349 Euro here recently, all the way up to the Pixel fold.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 8:32:36 PM
> I can fully understand that they don't want to weaken that by supporting fundamentally insecure devices.Except that there is nothing fundamentally insecure about them, they just don't support a specific convenience feature. You can straightforwardly support PIN-based unlocking by encrypting the PIN in ordinary persistent storage using a longer passphrase that only has to be entered during boot.
This is arguably even more secure because it allows the PIN to be dumped from active memory and require the longer passphrase again after a timeout, a limited number of bad attempts or in response to a panic button on the lock screen. Then the device doesn't contain the long passphrase whatsoever, instead of having it permanently stored inside of an opaque enclave that itself could (and often does!) have its own vulnerabilities.
by AnthonyMouse
2/27/2026 at 4:11:35 PM
> I get all or nothing when your threat model is state actors.The problem for those of us in the USA, that labels anyone who disagrees with the current administration and ICE as a domestic terrorist, means that now everyone's threat model is a state actor.
The threat model of every citizen that dares to exercise their first amendment rights now escalated beyond corporate agendas to "How do I make sure Israeli & Palantir spyware doesn't end up on my phone? How do I make sure if my phone does get confiscated, Cellebrite can't image it or access the data?"
Even if that weren't the case, I see no valid reason to be lax with security in 2026. There's no excuse anymore, I mean we still have OEMs selling phones that they do not issue security updates for after purchase. That's just gross negligence.
by thewebguyd
2/27/2026 at 6:54:37 PM
How do I make sure if my phone does get confiscated, Cellebrite can't image it or access the data?"In this context one super-nice feature of GrapheneOS (do check the legal ramifications though, IANAL) is that it supports a duress PIN. It's an alternative PIN that immediately erases your phone (probably throws away your FDE keys?) and clears your eSIM.
Besides that, it also supports configurable time to reboot after no unlocks. This is relevant because it is typically much harder to exfiltrate data BFU (before first unlock) than after. iPhone also supports this, but only does it after I think 3 or 4 days. On GrapheneOS, this can be set as short as 10 minutes when there is a risk of your phone getting confiscated. Of course, you can also manually reboot, but that's not possible in every situation.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 5:22:53 PM
Graphene is OSS, so if you want to create a fork that supports other phones, you are free to do so. The maintainers have limited amount of resources, why wouldn't they focus those resources on the most secure hardware if that is what aligns with their goals? If you have different goals, create or fund a fork to support more hardware.by limagnolia
2/27/2026 at 11:38:02 PM
Really? Wow? What an insight.That being said, am I allowed to complain. Or simply dismiss them for supporting only Google hardware?
Or should I create a fork instead?
by miroljub
2/27/2026 at 10:33:51 PM
>Not everyone needs kernel hardening, or always E2EE (as with signal).If application processors and hardware crypto accelerators are good enough to make this invisible to the end user, then why not? Why not have everyone be on hardened kernels by default and let them opt-in to insecure ones instead of the other way around?
by ysnp
2/27/2026 at 2:37:32 PM
Perfect really is the enemy of good when it comes to GrapheneOSby RealStickman_
2/27/2026 at 6:32:27 PM
It really isn't; the project acknowledges numerous existing compromises. Take a look at their roadmap or any number of threads if you think they only ever implement perfect features.That's also an unfair take when one considers how many improvements they've upstreamed to AOSP and how many quality of life features they've implemented.
by handedness
2/27/2026 at 11:32:09 PM
When feasible, they also provide harm reduction updates for legacy hardware.by bwoah
2/27/2026 at 8:23:12 PM
> Sadly the reality is that most other Android devices are simply not secure enough.This seems like a bad reason for not supporting a device. If the device doesn't have a hardware feature then the OS it came with can't be doing it either, and then all you're doing is leaving the user with all of the other security problems in the OEM OS that otherwise could have been improved by replacing it.
by AnthonyMouse
2/27/2026 at 10:56:07 PM
The point of GrapheneOS isn't improving a generic device's security, it's about setting an example for a highly private and secure OS. It's a FOSS project, so nothing stops a committed individual or community from using other device targets, but the main project chooses specifically to use their smaller resources to pursue excellence rather than mediocrity.by ysnp
2/28/2026 at 12:35:54 AM
I've had people tell me that nobody should use anything but GrapheneOS and stop supporting alternatives to throw all support into that because the others are "less secure", and now that GrapheneOS isn't for everyone and anyone -- the majority of people -- without a specific narrow selection of hardware should get lost.We need the people who buy $100 phones to have the ability to put a better OS on them than the burning mudslide that comes with them, is all I'm saying.
by AnthonyMouse
2/28/2026 at 7:40:03 AM
>I've had people tell me that nobody should use anything but GrapheneOS and stop supporting alternatives to throw all support into that because the others are "less secure"Without having an kind of authoritative knowledge or experience on the topic, those people are wrong and please ignore them. The argument has generally been that if you are specifically after privacy and security in your personal device then GrapheneOS or post-MIE iOS will be your most sensible choices. You CAN choose devices for other reasons, as has always been your prerogative.
The question of whether to support 'alternatives' is fraught. It used to be that there were two other OS projects that happened to be collaborating and adopting features from GrapheneOS and that would have been reasonable. The main argument (from GrapheneOS) in that case has been for people to please invest in alternatives with approaches to privacy and security that stand up to threat-model driven design and real world attacker/defender experience.
GrapheneOS was never meant to be alone in pushing for things like hardened secure element-based protection of secrets and side-channel resistant rate-limiting of unlock attempts, memory tagging/hardened memory allocators/secure application spawning/dynamic code loading control, anti-persistence hardening, prompt security patching, network/sensor permissions, contact/storage scopes, PIN scrambling, auto reboot etc. Unfortunately very few other projects that I am aware of are looking into doing things like this to give the device owner control and mastery over their data.
>and now that GrapheneOS isn't for everyone and anyone -- the majority of people -- without a specific narrow selection of hardware should get lost.
GrapheneOS tries to make most of their hardening transparent and non-intrusive by default. They also spend a lot of time and resources working on usability (sandboxed-Google-play and the web installer) and now accessibility (upcoming text-to-speech implementation?). The idea is that if you have a Pixel and choose to use GrapheneOS then it should be as easy to use as they can manage without compromising their efforts improving privacy/security. In that sense, GrapheneOS is for anyone and not just security nerds or tinfoil hats.
The exclusivity to Pixels is an unfortunate consequence of being the only platform equipped to provide what they need to achieve their goals. If multiple devices supported what they needed from the beginning, they would have probably supported three or four models from different brands as targets (for example you could imagine a couple Pixel lines + one Samsung line (Europe/North America/Oceania), one Xiaomi line (East Asia/South East Asia/South Asia/South America), one Tecno line (Africa). This is speculation on my part, but the main point is that the Android OEMs have been seriously slacking on basic privacy/security leading to this kind of situation.
>We need the people who buy $100 phones to have the ability to put a better OS on them than the burning mudslide that comes with them, is all I'm saying.
No disagreement here. This relies on AOSP adopting improvements and also on Google tightening their certification (for Play Store) requirements to include stronger privacy and security guarantees.
by ysnp
2/27/2026 at 3:51:08 PM
Every GrapheneOS proponent I've seen has claimed that other devices are inferior to Pixel security wise, and that's why they're not supported. That always sounded a bit odd to me and certainly seems to have a bit more nuance based on your comment. Thank you for adding some clarity here.by tjpnz
2/27/2026 at 6:36:10 PM
See their list of device requirements: https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devicesby bwoah
2/27/2026 at 4:10:34 PM
There's really nothing odd that company that runs Project Zero also builds devices that are well secured.by izacus
2/27/2026 at 4:25:09 PM
Qubes OS, operating system designed for security, doesn't prevent its installation on computers without VT-d. It will just warn you.by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 5:24:43 PM
Graphene doesn't really try to stop you. They just don't spend their own efforts on making it possible. It is OSS so, your free to spend your efforts where you want to.by limagnolia
2/27/2026 at 6:15:11 PM
This is however not their main argument. I doubt they would accept such pull request.by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 6:59:43 PM
It would require a significant commitment of limited resources to broadly support insecure devices with very little upside, and to do so would constitute gross mismanagement of the project.Meanwhile, others are completely free to fork numerous GrapheneOS improvements or benefit from their upstream improvements (as some have, including Google).
Why can't you understand that?
by handedness
2/27/2026 at 8:57:34 PM
I never mentioned any commitment except accepting pull requests, did I? Qubes can do that and doesn't require a fork. Are you saying they have much more resources?by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 6:35:05 PM
No pull request necessary, forks don't require approval.by limagnolia
2/27/2026 at 7:52:35 PM
The problem with laptops is that UEFI is a shadow operating system that keeps running after boot, with a bunch of security vulnerabilities. Furthermore all Intel / AMD chips have a microprocessor state called SMF which if you trigger it basically gives you carte blanche to do whatever you want."Trusted Boot" is a meme on x86. If you really want something like that you need to do what Oxide Computer is doing and rip out UEFI for good and implement your own secure boot chain.
Qubes is great but at the end of the day cannot protect against evil maid attacks to the level that pixel or apple phones can. Its great at making sure a browser exploit cannot steal your banking credentials you have open in a different virtual machine but cannot overcome the limitations of the platforms it builds off of.
So I understand why the GrapheneOS folks do what they do.
See also: "X86 considered harmful" by the founder of Qubes OS (posted in 2015!)
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf
by upboundspiral
2/27/2026 at 8:59:05 PM
I use Qubes with TPM and Heads and with a hardware key. All based on FLOSS, so its possible.by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 6:58:06 PM
As one who has lived out of both operating systems for years, I struggle with the way you invariably make value judgments about GrapheneOS every time it comes up in a thread, based on your (justifiable) appreciation for Qubes OS. The same thing happens in reverse on the GrapheneOS forums, by the way.Both lines of thinking are faulty, and attempting to directly extrapolate from one project to the other (in either direction) mostly only conveys a lack of understanding of both projects, even (especially?) one's favored project.
Joanna Rutkowska herself admitted that the difficult nature of trying to contain the PC hardware stack made it ultimately feel like she lost the war. Qubes OS is inherently vastly more vulnerable than GrapheneOS, in large part precisely because of their different approaches to hardware. Some of this has been mitigated by developments made since she stepped back from the project, but some of it will always remain. How to deal with this inherent conflict is not a simple matter and the two projects have taken two distinctly different approaches.
In the cases of both projects, I think they made justifiable decisions in their approaches. I use and contribute to both projects.
If you've been using Qubes OS long enough, you'll remember a time when trying to run it on anything that wasn't essentially identical to the ThinkPads used by Qubes OS devs often presented a major challenge.
GrapheneOS is a fundamentally different project in scope, and each project has a subset of users which seem unable to do anything but evaluate the other project based on the criteria set by the one they like.
"The goal of the project is not to slightly improve some aspects of insecure devices and supporting a broad set of devices would be directly counter to the values of the project. A lot of the low-level work also ends up being fairly tied to the hardware."
GrapheneOS achieves significantly more security on the hardware level than Qubes OS, in very large part specifically due to the nature of the project. It's also an infinitely simpler OS to get up and running with, on both current-gen flagship hardware and current-gen value-prop hardware available in just about any store which sells cell phones.
In addition to all that, by the nature of the respective code bases it presents a significantly smaller attack surface than a computer running Qubes OS.
Securing a single device type with excellent hardware security is simply much more viable a project than securing a broad range of devices with hardware security that is, at best, pretty terrible.
Repeatedly criticizing one project without significant familiarity with both is not just pointless, it's counterproductive to aims of FOSS privacy and security.
by handedness
2/27/2026 at 9:16:42 PM
> In addition to all that, by the nature of the respective code bases it presents a significantly smaller attack surface than a computer running Qubes OS.I critisize precisely because I don't understand what you're talking about. The last relevant VM escape was in 2006, discovered by Rutkowska herself. Since then, nothing could access my secrets in an offline vault VM. I would appreciate a clarification, how GrapheneOS can be more secure without reliable virtualization.
AFAIK Xen security relies on 100k LoC. And this is in addition to the virtualization. How many LoC does GrapheneOS require to provide its security? How can it have less attack surface than Xen? Developers replying to me here never provided an understandable reasoning, only keep repeating that it's "very, very secure", without even mentioning any threat model.
Doesn't GrapheneOS rely on closed Google's hardware to provide its security? I would never trust Google with that. How can I not critisize such approach?
by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 3:26:02 PM
Imagine if the Linux project had this same mentality. Thank goodness they don't.by CivBase
2/27/2026 at 6:13:11 PM
Which leads to things like laptop sleep working inconsistently. Instead of having a good reputation, Linux's reputation gets hurt by all the random devices it allegedly supports.by charcircuit
2/27/2026 at 9:17:57 PM
Devices designed for Linux work flawlessly, just like it happens with Mac and Windows.by fsflover
2/28/2026 at 5:43:22 PM
But at least your laptop can run Linux. You get to decide as the user whether the problems that come with it are worth it.And while some machines have problems like that, there are plenty of manufacturers who will sell you Linux devices with better support.
Also I don't think Linux's reputation is as problamatic as you make it seem. It is astoundingly popular and continues to grow - owing in no small part to its accessibility.
by CivBase
2/27/2026 at 3:52:05 PM
Imagine if Apple had this same mentality, they would never be where they are.(/s in case it is needed.)
As a smaller project, choosing a small set of hardware and supporting it really well (aside from security reasons) seems like a much better strategy than supporting tens of devices badly (go to e.g. the /e/OS forums to see what regressions people are dealing with after monthly updates).
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 4:19:02 PM
Indeed. Apple is financially successful, but they're ultimately a minority player in pretty much every market they engage with - including desktop/laptop computers and even mobile devices globally. And for me they are just as inaccessible as GraphineOS.But for Apple that is not necessarily a bad thing. They're a company. Their goal is to make money and they are highly successful at it. GraphineOS is not a company. They don't make money. Which begs the question of what is GraphineOS's real goal and is it valuable? Creating a maximally secure mobile OS seems valuable on its face, but that value is undercut by its inaccessibility.
by CivBase
2/27/2026 at 7:03:05 PM
that value is undercut by its inaccessibilityYou are saying this like GrapheneOS only runs on some unobtanium hardware. I can literally hop on my bike and pick up a phone that runs GrapheneOS in 5 minutes, every day of the week. Also, it's available in pretty much all price classes except maybe a 100-200 Euro phone that runs on a Unisoc CPU. Pixel 9a regularly goes for 350 Euro here and you can go all the way up to an expensive flagship with a Pixel Fold (or anything in between). Even in the 100-200 bracket you can probably pick up a refurbished 8a that should still be supported until 2031.
I know that they are not sold in every country, but worst case it should be possible to get your hands on one second hand or refurbished.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 8:52:32 PM
The Pixel hardware does not have the capabilities I consider to be essential for my personal phone.by CivBase
2/27/2026 at 5:09:18 PM
GrapheneOS is working with a manufacturer to change this:[0]> We're working with a major OEM and the devices will be the future versions of existing models they have now. The devices will be priced similarly to Pixels. The initial devices will have a flagship Snapdragon SoC for the best security and support time. Snapdragon flagships have significantly better CPU and GPU performance than Pixels. Snapdragon provides high quality Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GNSS and cellular support as part of the SoC. eSIM and other functionality is also provided by the SoC. Snapdragon has decent image processing functionality included too, and good neural network acceleration.
[0]: https://old.reddit.com/r/GrapheneOS/comments/1o32gpg/deleted...
by _emacsomancer_
2/27/2026 at 10:05:26 PM
That "major OEM" seems to be Motorola, i.e. Lenovo.by hagbard_c
2/27/2026 at 10:30:43 PM
I hope HMD reach out next: https://www.hmdsecure.com/by ysnp
2/28/2026 at 11:23:15 AM
The more, the better. If Google really decides to follow the fruit factory in closing down Android I hope that AOSP-derived distributions fork Android to create a large enough base to make it a worthwhile target for application development. Not matter what happens I'll hop off the Android train since I won't use a device with a Google account - never done so and never will. Nae lairds, nae kings, we are free men!by hagbard_c
2/27/2026 at 4:11:50 PM
Huge opportunity for Lenovo/Motorola here who have been the quiet Linux favorite for a while but we shall see if they even bother.by hypercube33
2/27/2026 at 6:57:27 PM
Sounds like a consumer problem for their own choices of vendor lock inby jasonfrost
2/27/2026 at 11:54:52 AM
Would love to ditch google and use grapheneOS, however have so many banking and (stupid) outlook for work.by scrollop
2/27/2026 at 12:32:49 PM
You can check banking app compatibility here:https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compa...
by amelius
2/27/2026 at 3:35:33 PM
Even if it works now, how can you be sure the next app update doesn't break it in the name of security?by CorrectHorseBat
2/27/2026 at 4:07:51 PM
Because it would cause public uproar.by amelius
2/28/2026 at 11:08:15 AM
I very much doubt thatby CorrectHorseBat
2/27/2026 at 12:42:16 PM
The outlook app works for me on GrapheneOS, is there something about it that doesn't work for you?Many banking apps do work on GrapheneOS, the list had already been linked to by others
by ninjasmosa
2/27/2026 at 2:30:13 PM
> Would love to ditch google and use grapheneOSgrapheneOS only works with google phones.
by ekjhgkejhgk
2/27/2026 at 3:44:26 PM
For now[0].And I don't really think that people mean using google hardware but rather being mined by google software.
May I ask, if you (a) just want to be technically correct, (b) don't see the difference or (c) are trying to make a point I don't understand and if so would be willing to explain?
---
[0] https://piunikaweb.com/2026/02/02/grapheneos-non-pixel-hardw...
by kruffalon
2/27/2026 at 3:06:24 PM
I would rather pay a one off ransom to google, than have them harvest all my data and profit from them in perpetuity.Better yet, you can buy a used pixel phone.
by 4gotunameagain
2/27/2026 at 3:18:40 PM
Pixel 9 Pro handsets are going for around $500 on the secondary markets like ebay. That's a only a single generation off from their current Pixel 10 models and you still get OS and security updates until 2031.Not a bad deal and pretty crazy how fast smartphones depreciate now.
by burningChrome
2/27/2026 at 3:56:07 PM
Indeed and Pixel 10 was 549 Euro here just a few weeks ago and Pixel 9a as low as 338 Euro.by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 12:28:53 PM
The outlook webapp is quite decent. I've never used their native app, but I've manahed to get by fine with their webapp, even though notifications don't work (I just check it regularily). IIRC K9/Thunderbird also has support for exchange now.by TobTobXX
2/27/2026 at 12:07:25 PM
Apparently a lot of banking apps work with the sandboxed Google malwares. Not sure though, I'm not a user (wrong hardware)by sheiyei
2/27/2026 at 1:30:26 PM
Correct. I am using my Dutch bank and credit card apps without any issues. Someone linked the curated GrapheneOS banking list already. If your bank does not support it, you could either contact them. If they require remote attestation, this can be implemented for GrapheneOS as well:https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-gu...
If the bank is very hard-nosed about it, you could consider keeping an old iPhone or Pixel (because long security updates) for banking if it is practical to do for you. 95% without big tech is also a big win. Of course, if you need to have it with you at all times, that might not be a worthwhile option.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 12:34:12 PM
can confirm. And there are even some pages that list banking and other apps working on GrapheneOS. It's actually very few that don't work with sandboxed Google Play API.edit: https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compa...
by wafflemaker
2/27/2026 at 1:09:33 PM
Can you not setup your work email through a regular email client? I thought the days of being locked into Outlook specifically went away with Exchange. Everywhere I've worked since has been able to.Also, what kind of banking are people doing that requires an app? I genuinely don't know what it could be.
by kgwxd
2/27/2026 at 1:57:22 PM
> Also, what kind of banking are people doing that requires an app? I genuinely don't know what it could be.Close to every bank in the EU requires their user to have an app, for MFA (both for logging in and for validating transactions - transfers, payments). They use the smartphone's TPM. I have yet to see one that allows you to use your own MFA app.
The few I've seen that don't require it will validate the same through text messages (not everyone has a smartphone); though if you associate their app even once, you're screwed - the app it is from now on.
by duozerk
2/27/2026 at 2:39:09 PM
>Close to every bank in the EU requires their user to have an appPossibly this was hyperbole but in any case it's not correct at all.
Anecdotally, of my two EU (massive legacy French) banks, neither requires a mobile app. SMS all the way.
Even Wise, a cutting-edge neobank, does not require you to use its app. And its website accepts standard TOTP authenticator for 2FA.
Revolut is app-only, which is why I never use it.
by bluebarbet
2/27/2026 at 3:59:18 PM
Here in The Netherlands banks used to offer authenticator devices, which they are phasing out (you can still use them, but they wont replace them once they run out of battery). Pretty much all banks switched to app-only.No SMS at all (which is not surprising, because SMS is not secure).
Also, IMO fingerprint/face-based authentication is much nicer/quicker, especially for online payment flows like iDEAL (Dutch predecessor to Wero). And banks here work on GrapheneOS, so not much is lost.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 9:08:59 PM
>And banks here work on GrapheneOSUntil they don't.
by bluebarbet
2/27/2026 at 4:04:52 PM
> Anecdotally, of my two EU (massive legacy French) banks, neither requires a mobile app. SMS all the way.My wording was bad, sorry; but try to install their app just once. After that, I'd bet you won't ever be able to go back to SMS validation (which is what I was talking about at the end of my comment).
If not, I'd be curious to know the banks you're talking about (to consider switching to them, for one thing). What I said above is true of Caisse d'Epargne, HSBC, CCF, among others.
by duozerk
2/27/2026 at 9:07:23 PM
>I'd be curious to know the banks you're talking aboutFortuneo (internet-only subsidiary of Crédit Mutuel) and LCL. I have had both their apps installed at points in the past. In both cases they defaulted back to SMS 2FA upon uninstalling, though I remember worrying I would have the problem you describe.
Ultimately I can't see how a bank could get away with forcing (rather than just pushing) existing customers to install an app. This would surely be a breach of contract.
by bluebarbet
2/27/2026 at 4:14:35 PM
> though if you associate their app even once, you're screwedCan you go in branch and get that fixed?
by wizzwizz4
2/27/2026 at 1:39:58 PM
It's way more comfortable to login with fingerprint and not going through a longer login to the website.Especially since in many countries it requires a national e-ID that is an app on your phone.
by wafflemaker
2/27/2026 at 3:23:31 PM
It's nice to have widgets.by scrollop
2/27/2026 at 5:58:20 PM
Theres e/OS where you can have a locked bootloader with some phonesby zwarag
2/27/2026 at 2:32:43 PM
Why do people need banking on their phones though? Banks have websites too.by ekjhgkejhgk
2/27/2026 at 2:38:33 PM
> Why do people need banking on their phones though? Banks have websites too.2FA. I was a smartphone hold-out for longer than anyone I know, but banks mandating 2FA with no options for doing it in a standards-compliant way or any way that doesn't involve the app stores was what finally broke my resistance.
by gyulai
2/27/2026 at 2:41:25 PM
This is asked again and again. Apparently you guys in the USA or in other parts of the world are still lucky, but in Europe banks must be compliant with regulation that more or less force them to do 2FA through their app with the biometric authentication of either an Android or an iOS phone. There are other ways (eg giving a hardware OTP generator to customers,) but apps are the cheapest solution.by pmontra
2/27/2026 at 5:18:06 PM
Do you have a link with information about this?I'm just wondering since I'm currently using 3 different European banks without any biometric authentication to unlock my phone, password manager or provide a 2FA.
I'm asking so that I can adjust in time to any new regulations I'm not aware of.
by kruffalon
2/27/2026 at 10:42:21 PM
This https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_customer_authenticationby pmontra
2/27/2026 at 11:37:44 PM
Thank you!I kind of jumped at the "biometric" part of your original comment.
Now I understand what you mean better and I'm not worried about my setup (although I question how it complies, but that is another matter).
by kruffalon
2/28/2026 at 7:05:56 AM
This is what I have to do for online payments.Credit cards, which are US companies, use 3D secure. It's a 6 digits PIN plus a code sent to me by SMS. Amazon stores the card data and very seldom asks me for those PINs.
One bank gave me a hardware OTP generator. I type in the code, plus the bank PIN, plus a random number they show on screen.
Other banks send a push notification to their app on my authorized device (only one of my devices can be authorized at a given time). I must confirm the operation with my fingerprint or with the bank PIN. The fingerprint is easier, no password manager to open.
The result is that I can do online banking anywhere around the world but I can't use credit cards online unless I am in my home country, because for some reasons SMSes don't reach me abroad. There might be something wrong in my contract but I've not been able to sort it out.
The last time I've been in Australia I put a local SIM in slot 2 of my phone and used it for local communications and data. I could receive calls on my home SIM but no SMS. I even contacted the customer service of a credit card to attempt to make SMSes reach me on the Australian number. Fat chance.
by pmontra
2/27/2026 at 4:30:59 PM
You can still find banks in Europe that do not force Google and Apple on you. They may ask you to use their own security devices for instance.by fsflover
2/27/2026 at 2:42:37 PM
My bank has no website or physical branches. They’re mobile-only, but their app is leaps and bounds ahead of the competition.by zipping1549
2/27/2026 at 1:14:06 PM
I don't much like the official Outlook app. Been using Nine for ages, it does everything I've needed.by rkagerer
2/27/2026 at 8:54:44 PM
AFAIK every popular Android phone uses a qualcomm modem chip with a separate OS that has complete access to ram. NSA most certainly has a backdoor there and such complete access to any Android phone. This was common knowledge after the Snowden stuff. I don't think this has changed at all since. Only few niche phones (pinephone) separate these systems or have a hardware switch to disable the cellular system.by jona-f
2/27/2026 at 10:22:23 PM
>I don't think this has changed at all since.There is common knowledge to suggest that it is not the case (or maybe is no longer the case):
>Mainstream smartphones do not provide DMA access from the baseband to the application processor's memory... Yes, getting baseband access then lets you monitor regular voice and SMS comms. But no, it does not instantly compromise the AP so using the Signal app would still be secure. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10906488
>Apple mitigates baseband processor vulnerabilities by putting it behind what's essentially an IOMMU. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29440154
>This is false FUD that keeps being repeated. It's not true. No iPhone ever has had a baseband with DMA access to my knowledge, and modern Qualcomm devices have advanced IOMMU systems to firewall away the baseband from the rest of system memory. I'm sure some phones somewhere existed where the baseband was privileged, but it's not the norm. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30393283
>Connecting a cellular radio via USB provides far less isolation than the approach of a tiny kernel driver connected to an IOMMU isolated cellular radio on mainstream devices. USB has immense complexity and attack surface, especially with a standard Linux kernel configuration. Forensic data extraction companies mostly haven't bothered using attack vectors other than USB due to it being such a weak point. Many of the things people claim about cellular radios in mainstream smartphones are largely not true and they're missing that other radios are implemented in a very comparable way. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46841004
by ysnp
2/27/2026 at 10:07:46 PM
> NSA most certainly has a backdoor there and such complete access to any Android phone.Citation needed?
> This was common knowledge after the Snowden stuff.
Not to me, it isn't? As far as I'm aware, most of the Snowden stuff were centered around PRISM, which allowed widescale wiretapping of internet backbone, as well as agreements with big cloud providers to allow tapping into their data.
I haven't seen anything indicating that there was widespread compromise of personal computing devices at such a deep level of the root of trust. I haven't seen any indication that the NSA has a backdoor in the earlyboot CPU of any device, whether that is the Qualcomm boot processor, the Intel Management Engine or the AMD Platform Security Processor (which all have similar capabilities and hidden firmware).
If I missed anything/have links to research into these backdoors, I'd like to see them!
by roblabla
2/28/2026 at 6:28:45 AM
The backdoor is that those are all US companies and the NSA can force them to comply.by jona-f
2/27/2026 at 12:19:12 PM
This piddly open source effort pales in comparison to what we should really be doing:Horizontally splitting Google into multiple companies.
Not division via department splits, but equal partitioning across the company into multiple horizontal businesses that compete on the same offerings.
The EU and next DOJ/FTC need to force this.
by echelon
2/27/2026 at 1:39:22 PM
I agree, but the probability that this is going to happen anytime soon is near-0. The current US administration is not going to rein in the tech broligarchy and if they did, it would be done out of spite and the pieces wold sold to administration-aligned oligarchs (e.g. Ellison), which might end up being worse.The EU is not going to force this, because it has enough fights to pick with the US, and this is not the hill that they are willing to die on. It would be far more likely for them to financially support an AOSP-based OS.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 1:55:56 PM
The EU simply is not (and should not) be able to split up google who operate international. But they can regulate the EU market and declare that a monopolist cannot operate there as a monopolist and introduce any arbitary rule achieving it.by lukan
2/27/2026 at 2:12:53 PM
Yes, though I think that is what echelon was aiming at - the EU saying either you break up or you cannot do business here.by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 3:30:30 PM
Not sure if you know this, but both Biden and Trump (in his previous admin) had their DOJ file lawsuits against Google. "United States v. Google LLC," which was filed in 2020 and focused on Google's dominance in search and advertising markets. A separate case was filed in 2023 targeted Google's monopolization of digital advertising technologies. The State of Texas also sued them in 2020.Google lost all three cases. The DOJ in all three recommended the company be broken up, but the judges disagreed. If you want to blame someone, then blame the judges, not the current admin or Bidens DOJ - both of whom said Google should be broken up.
by burningChrome
2/27/2026 at 4:03:39 PM
Trump 2 is very different from Trump 1 though. Trump 1 still had competent, less corrupt people in many positions. Grifters are going to grift.Anyway, I am going to stop here, since this will probably derail in a non-productive political discussion otherwise.
by microtonal
2/27/2026 at 11:47:20 AM
As of now, Google isn't destroying non-Google android installs, so F-droid will still work there (correct me if wrong). So until Google takes android fully closed or succeeds in getting popular/necessary apps to blacklist non-Google-verified devices, F-droid still has a roleby duskdozer
2/28/2026 at 6:59:17 PM
I still think they are planning on coming down side loading and app dev registration with newer phonesby asacrowflies
2/28/2026 at 6:58:46 PM
https://keepandroidopen.org/by asacrowflies
2/27/2026 at 1:42:08 PM
Is there a KDE/GNOME/kernel-like group forming to take over Android AOSP development and provide free alternative yet?by izacus
2/27/2026 at 11:49:22 AM
I hope so. The changes can mean two things: people can only use it easily in custom roms (I guess there is an overlap there) or they actually would play with Google: i guess technically they could as well register and sign the stuff with a Google key as the software is all FOSS and would allow defining another responsible developer (otherwise Google would have to through out all FOSS without CLA from their playstore). I guess quitting would be an option, but IMHO the outrage outside the bubble would probably be hardly noticable, so what would be the point?by riedel