alt.hn

1/14/2025 at 4:44:06 AM

DoubleClickjacking: A New type of web hacking technique

 https://www.paulosyibelo.com/2024/12/doubleclickjacking-what.html

by shinzub

1/17/2025 at 10:18:26 PM

Back in 2013 I discovered that you could use clickjacking to trick someone into buying anything you wanted from Amazon (assuming they were signed in). It took them almost a year to fix the issue. They never paid me a bounty.

https://onlineaspect.com/2014/06/06/clickjacking-amazon-com/

by joshfraser

1/18/2025 at 12:17:16 AM

Bug bounties are kind of a joke. they will invent almost any reason to not pay. it has to be something where the site is malfunctioning, not CSS tricks, which has to do with the browser , not the vendor. Clickjacking can work on any site, not just Amazon.

by paulpauper

1/17/2025 at 7:52:03 PM

This is clever, and I got a good laugh out of their example video. The demo UI of "Double click here" isn't very convincing - I bet there's a version of this that gets people to double click consistently though.

by maxrmk

1/18/2025 at 12:50:38 AM

Why stop at double-click? "Click here 10 times quickly to confirm you're human". Or some kind of clicker game.

by seanwilson

1/18/2025 at 1:47:46 AM

Like in reCAPTCHA (v2 at least) where it asks users to click on tiles to identify common objects like bridges or motorcycles. Surely one could conjure up a fake version of this.

by temporallobe

1/17/2025 at 9:24:40 PM

The exploit would be more effective if it obfuscated the UI on the authorization (victim) page. Right now, even if you double click a convincing button, it’s extremely obvious that you just got duped (no pun intended).

Sure, maybe the attacker can abuse the access privileges before you have a chance to revoke them. But it’s not exactly a smooth clickjacking.

I’d start by changing the dimensions of the parent window (prior to redirecting to victim) to the size of the button on the target page - no need to show everything around it (assuming you can make it scroll to the right place). And if the OAuth redirects to the attacker page, it can restore the size to the original.

Back in the day, this trick was used for clickjacking Digg upvotes.

by chatmasta

1/17/2025 at 10:10:44 PM

You can change the visibility of the target page so they wouldn't know

by joshfraser

1/18/2025 at 12:11:49 AM

How? You don't control the DOM on that. You can adjust the window prior to changing its location but that's it.

by chatmasta

1/17/2025 at 9:21:23 PM

Hmm. I guess it is never impossible that there’s a version of something that will trick people consistently. But, I’m kinda struggling to recall a time I’ve needed to double click on a website.

Actually the double-click action is pretty rare nowadays, right? In particular, I use it a lot to select a word in a terminal, but most of the time when I am getting UI instructions it is from a website about how to use the website itself, and since that’s a website it has to be abstract enough to also make sense for mobile users.

Telling people to double click is, I think, mostly dead.

by bee_rider

1/18/2025 at 12:02:17 AM

YouTube gets me to double-click on occasion:

- The page mostly loads

- An ad starts playing

- I attempt to hit "pause" while I go handle a thing or two [0]

- As I'm about to click "pause", the layout shifts to the left exactly enough for me to unmute the ad

- I immediately click again to stop listening to whatever scam is currently being peddled

[0] For some videos I like to read the description before watching. For all videos I like to make it as obvious as possible to Google that there isn't a real person watching the ad (browser not focused, ad muted, ...).

by hansvm

1/17/2025 at 9:31:53 PM

My mother constantly struggles between when to double click or not after decades of using computers. This is probably an issue that will die out with her generation, though.

Entirely separate, a common failure mode of dying mice is that they start generating spurious clicks. I've had a couple of logitechs do this to me. And the thing about scams is you can often legit make money off of very low success rates.

by foobazgt

1/17/2025 at 10:27:41 PM

> Entirely separate, a common failure mode of dying mice is that they start generating spurious clicks.

Speaking of things dying out, it's been so long since I used anything but a trackpad that I thought at first this was some strange claim about rodents!

by JadeNB

1/17/2025 at 9:25:54 PM

It doesn’t need to be a literal double click. It could be something like a CAPTCHA “confirm you’re human,” where you click once, it appears to load, and then you click a confirm button. Do it fast enough and it might appear like a double click.

Not sure this would work with the exploit though.

by chatmasta

1/17/2025 at 10:14:56 PM

Google drive and similar sites use double click for folders to open similar to a regular OS would. Single click tends to show some metadata where the double click does the actual navigation.

it pisses me off

by dylan604

1/17/2025 at 9:50:28 PM

Thankfully this shouldn't become a large problem, because websites simply don't load that quick

by Vortigaunt

1/17/2025 at 10:09:47 PM

It could be preloaded

by joshfraser

1/14/2025 at 5:52:00 AM

I think the suggested mitigation will only work when the user double-clicks without moving the mouse.

So I'd try adding a small timeout when the tab is visible:

  document.addEventListener("visibilitychange", () => {
    if (!document.hidden)
      setTimeout(enableButtons, 200)
  })

by efortis

1/17/2025 at 9:34:49 PM

and `disableButtons` on `document.hidden`

by efortis

1/17/2025 at 6:04:33 PM

New fear unlocked lazy cookie consent banners.

by sharpshadow

1/17/2025 at 8:28:33 PM

I'm a little skeptical that this is a real exploit.

When I watched the Salesforce video, the exploit was demonstrated by pointing the browser at a file on disk, not on a public website. I also don't understand the "proof," IE, something showed up in the salesforce inbox, but I don't understand how that shows that the user was hacked. It appears to be an automated email from an identity provider.

I also don't understand when the popup is shown, and what the element is when the popup is closed.

Some slow-mo with highlighting on the fake window, and the "proof of exploit," might make this easier to understand and demonstrate

by gwbas1c

1/17/2025 at 8:41:27 PM

It's also not a novel threat model. For example prior art, the browser confirmation dialogs in Firefox at least don't enable their buttons until the window has had focus for 500ms or so. Possibly to avoid inadvertently unintentionally clicking "run" on a recently downloaded item, but it solves for this too and I wouldn't be shocked if this was on their mind too.

If I were running some site where pressing a button does some kind of auth that I really want a user to read, that seems like a reasonable mitigation compared to the hyperbole found in the article:

> This technique seemingly affects almost every website

by akersten

1/17/2025 at 6:23:41 PM

Am I mistaken or does this require the user to allow pop-ups?

by yellow_lead

1/17/2025 at 6:41:12 PM

Default configuration for most browsers is to allow popups if it was initiated by a user action.

by gruez

1/14/2025 at 4:46:35 AM

Title: DoubleClickjacking: A New Era of UI Redressing

by gnabgib

1/17/2025 at 6:50:06 PM

Browser content should never be able to modify the configuration of my desktop window layout by opening a new window. There I said it.

by krunck

1/17/2025 at 9:15:28 PM

TFA doesn't use separate windows, only separate tabs.

by KTibow

1/17/2025 at 8:27:14 PM

Agreed, but I think this was a workaround for early web apps that existed in the primitive days. You'd need two webpages of the same site open to complete some task, but the apps weren't sophisticated enough to do that within a single window/tab. Once they did it back then, now too many web apps and workflows would suffer if they just killed that functionality entirely, too many users would scream.

by NoMoreNicksLeft

1/17/2025 at 7:52:39 PM

Bit off topic, but what's the reasoning behind messing with the native browser scroll here. Almost gets me motion sick when scrolling through this article.

by bangaladore

1/18/2025 at 1:30:20 AM

Nah in my opinion it needs more acceleration, really why not just basically remap my mousewheel to home/end

by p3rls

1/17/2025 at 8:56:43 PM

It is the height of irony to me that a blog post complaining about clickjacking is presented on a website that is guilty of scrolljacking.

by packtreefly

1/17/2025 at 8:58:14 PM

I thought the same. Glad to see it called out here. Maybe that's the post for next week...

by thoughtpalette

1/17/2025 at 9:37:35 PM

the scrolling is almost normal in librewolf - but that is with privacy badger blocking 14 trackers on that page ...

by mediumsmart

1/17/2025 at 8:17:24 PM

Marketing people have demanded this on many websites sites I've been involved with. Don't ask me why.

by technion

1/17/2025 at 9:57:26 PM

My hypothesis on this is that marketers who have personal MacBooks but are forced to use Windows computers at work, with mice with notched scroll wheels, find JS-driven smooth scrolling to be superior to the native snapping experience they see at work on many websites. But it wreaks havoc on people who already have computers with native high-resolution trackpads. Alas, the folks at big companies care more about their at-work than at-home experience, and it's been cargo-culted to smaller companies now as well. The conversation "detect if there is indeed a trackpad being used" never even comes up.

by btown

1/17/2025 at 9:10:38 PM

Maybe the industry should develop a secret header we can all have our browser send to disable this sort of thing. Like `X-Shibboleet: true`.

by ndriscoll

1/17/2025 at 8:32:50 PM

What is it? Smooth scrolling?

by dmix

1/17/2025 at 8:36:27 PM

From the html:

// SmoothScroll for websites v1.2.1

by bangaladore

1/17/2025 at 9:26:58 PM

You'd think the library would first check for macOS/iOS which already has far superior smooth scrolling.

by hombre_fatal